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Currency Policies and the Nature ofLitigation 
in Colonial New England 
Judicial enforcement of debt agreements was one of the central and most important 
aspects of government promotion of the nascent colonial economy.1,'2 Nevertheless, 
legal historians have characterized the colonial court system in contrasting terms as a 
bulwark of pre-industrial cultural norms impeding development, or as a crucial cata- 
lyst of commercial transformation. In either case, legal historians' focus on law devel- 
oped in the courts, as opposed to the policies of the legislative or executive branchs of 
government, has led to an assumption that the law adjusts in some natural way to 
changing economic and cultural climates. According to this view, lawsuits are an indi- 
rect reflection of prevailing cultural norms and market conditions. Judges adapt the 
law as those norms and conditions change. The court system therefore fulfills an insti- 
tutional role of ensuring that the law keeps pace with economic and societal transfor- 
mation, and comes close to optimally satisfying the legal needs of local communities. 
The most prominent description of the insular and community-oriented base of co- 
lonial law is Morton Horwitz's The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860. 
Horwitz emphasizes the centrality to eighteenth-century law of limitations on market 
activity such as the just price and usury doctrines, contracts involving transfers of 
property rather than monetary payments, and damages based on equity and fairness 
rather than on satisfying expectations3 Emphasizing the prevalence of litigation based 
on direct property exchanges, Horwitz concludes that the law reflected undeveloped 
markets and a community-oriented society in which goods "were usually not thought 
of as being fungible. . . . [and] [e]xchange was not conceived of in terms of future 
monetary return."4 To Horwitz, colonial law reflected a pre-industrial communitarian 
mindset, "essentially antagonistic to the interests of commercial classes,"5 in which 
justification for contractual obligation was "the inherent justice or fairness of an ex- 
change."6 Colonial law applied by judges, therefore, reflected the values associated 
with pre-industrial, agrarian societies. In this respect, Horwitz contrasts the judicial 
doctrine of the eighteenth century with that of the nineteenth century, when judges be- 
gan using common law instrumentally to promote capitalist values and a market econ- 
omy. With regard to both the colonial period and the nineteenth century, however, 
Horwitz portrays the law as harmoniously synchronized to advance prevailing cultural 
norms and preferences regarding economic activity. 
More recently, Bruce Mann's Neighbors and Strangers: Law and Community in 
Early Connecticut presents a contrasting interpretation of colonial law and its relation 
to market development. Mann examined changes observable in litigation data, rather 
than changes in legal doctrine. He found that litigation related to book accounts domi- 
1 This dissertation was completed under the direction of Robert W. Gordon at Yale Law 
School. 
2 Debt litigation dominated the caseload of the colonial courts. Debt cases, for example, con- 
stituted 74 percent of all cases heard during the period 1725 to 1774 in the Plymouth, Massa- 
chusetts County Court of Common Pleas, the court of original jurisdiction for civil (non- 
criminal) lawsuits. See Nelson, Dispute, pp. 23-24. 
3 See Horwitz, Transformation, pp. 160-73. 
4 Ibid., pp. 162-63. 
5 Ibid., p. 167. 
6 Ibid., p. 160. 
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nated the court dockets in the seventeenth century.7 Book account disputes were fre- 
quently contested in court, and judges in these cases tailored their decisions to the in- 
dividual litigants and their unique circumstances. By the 1720s and 1730s, however, 
Mann found that litigation had changed in two ways. First, the debt cases that were 
litigated increasingly involved formal credit instruments, the terms of which left little 
to dispute in court. Greater use of formal credit instruments therefore corresponded 
closely with an increasing percentage of debt cases ending in a default judgment 
(where the debtor did not appear to contest the dispute) or confession of judgment 
(where the debtor conceded responsibility for the debt). Second, the volume of litiga- 
tion increased exponentially-beyond population growth--over the first half of the 
eighteenth century. 
Mann interprets the default judgments as creditors and debtors using the court sys- 
tem to record debts in the courts' registers. Default judgments allowed creditors to es- 
tablish their "place in line" to debtors' assets. Default judgments also secured credi- 
tors' interests in debtors' property by allowing quick execution (seizure and possibly 
sale of the debtors' property by sheriffs) at their discretion. Debtors acquiesced to the 
entry of judgments against them by default because they too benefited from the bu- 
reaucratization of credit, possibly from lower interest rates. According to Mann, 
"credit had become something extended in single transactions in return for formal ad- 
missions of liability."8 Thus, to Mann, the high percentage of cases ending in default 
indicates the creation of a modernized mechanism for debt recording, similar in kind 
to today's perfection of security interests through Article 9 of the Uniform Commer- 
cial Code. 
In Mann's account, the bureaucratization of the courts' role reflected an institutional 
transformation resulting from economic advance and the commercialization of the so- 
ciety. In sum, economic advance led to more transactions that crossed community 
lines. Formal credit instruments, which were difficult to contest in court, were better 
suited for impersonal contractual relations. Presumably to lower interest rates, credi- 
tors and debtors recorded default judgments at the time debt agreements were entered 
into. In the process, the courts' primary function changed from dispute-resolution to 
debt recordation. An institutional base of the colonial economy transformed to ac- 
commodate economic growth and commercialization.9 
My Dissertation presents a starkly different view of the colonial court system's role 
in the economy. The Dissertation presents the results of an empirical study (described 
below) demonstrating that default judgments were not a rationalized means of security 
recordation, but represented real defaults, that is, creditors using litigation to collect 
debts when debtors failed to pay after the terms of their loans had passed. Moreover, I 
' Book accounts were records (like a tab) of goods or services others took on credit. In the co- 
lonial period, in addition to being used in more formal creditor-debtor relations, people in a 
community established accounts with each other, taking goods and services on credit, and 
gradually reciprocating by exchanging different goods and services over time. 
8 Mann, Neighbors, p. 40. 
9 In one passage, for example, Mann states that: "An expanding economy requires that indi- 
vidual transactions be governed by generally applicable rules. Because of the sheer number of 
such transactions and the distances they may involve, they have to be conducted in a routine 
fashion. Their form and the legal rules that direct hem must be uniform and calculable. Rational 
economic exchange requires the assurance that like cases will be treated alike. To provide that 
assurance, general rules override the individuality of particular cases and force them into a 
common mold. Formal requirements hat limit litigation to the instruments themselves and re- 
strict appeals homogenize the underlying transactions and give them a uniform, predictable le- 
gal character." Neighbors, p. 36. 
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empirically examined the level of court fees imposed on the litigants in relation to the 
debts that ended in default judgment and found them to be so high as to create a disin- 
centive to record debts during stable economic conditions.10 How, then, should we 
characterize the nature of debt litigation, and how should we explain the exponentially 
increasing volume of litigation in the first half of the eighteenth century and, more 
generally, the colonial court system's role in the economy? 
Relying on extensive research of primary materials, my Dissertation emphasizes the 
ways in which currency policies enacted by colonial assemblies, mercantilist policies 
adopted by Parliament and the Board of Trade in England, as well as domestic and in- 
ternational economic conditions, influenced the forms in which people transacted and 
the volume of litigation. Colonial governments began issuing paper fiat currencies in 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries as a method of financing increasing 
military expenditures. Each colony's annual determination of the paper currency in 
circulation reflected a struggle within colonial assemblies, which faced pressure from 
part of the public-often debtors-to issue paper money in greater volume, and con- 
flicting pressure from English and New England merchants who desired a stable cur- 
rency of high value to satisfy English import debts. In New England, the tensions be- 
tween the elected, representative assemblies and the English-representatives of a 
foreign sovereign promoting a mercantilist agenda-led to policies that created disas- 
trous uncertainty. New England experienced periods of steady inflation as well as of 
currency scarcity, when colonial citizens were forced to use promissory notes as a 
substitute for cash, and to revert to commodity money exchange and barter-like trans- 
actions, such as paying laborers in shop notes. 
I present data revealing that periods of exponentially increasing litigation coincide 
with economic conditions and the periods of greatest uncertainty relating to govern- 
ment currency policies. In a context of high court fees that would ordinarily deter 
litigation, exponentially increasing litigation can be attributed to two economic con- 
ditions. First, litigation increased during times of economic recession and monetary 
scarcity, often driven by depressed credit conditions in Britain, when debtors on a 
widespread basis were simply unable to pay their debts. Second, litigation increased 
in response to inflation and uncertainty about colonial governments' currency poli- 
cies. During periods of inflation, or when the public predicted inflation based on the 
governments' inability to commit to its currency policies, debtors failed to repay 
their debts as a delaying tactic to benefit from declining currency values, forcing 
their creditors to sue. Inflation lowered the real value of court fees as well as the un- 
derlying debts. I trace the effects on litigation of British mercantilist and domestic 
currency policies in a detailed account of the first half of the eighteenth century in 
Massachusetts. 
In contrast to the optimistic rendering of the courts in the standard account, contem- 
porary pamphlets concerning Massachusetts's currency policies show that colonial 
citizens were frustrated by the swamping of the courts with debt-related litigation dur- 
ing periods of currency instability, that some complained bitterly about excessive 
court fees, and that serious questions were raised about judges' dogged enforcement of 
the common law principle of nominalism-allowing debtors to satisfy their debts with 
payment in nominal, not real, values of the debts. In a 1743 pamphlet, one writer 
claimed about nominalism that: 
10 In the Plymouth County Court of Common Pleas in 1740, for example, fees comprised an 
astounding 79 percent of the underlying debt for the quartile of cases reflecting the smallest 
debts. The average and median court fee / debt ratios for all cases were a substantial 32.6 per- 
cent and 21.7 percent, respectively. 
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This [legal tender] Law... habituat[ed] Debtors to suffer themselves to be sued for indis- 
putable Debts, and to appeal from Judgments obtain'd against 'em upon their own De- 
faults to the Superior Court merely for Delay ... [T]his Sort of Actions multiply'd in Pro- 
portion, to the great Hurt and Scandal of the Country; insomuch that the Number of such 
Suits within the Province was increas'd ... Between the Years 1730 and 1742, to near 
double what it was before."1 
Thomas Hutchinson (the future Governor) wrote in 1736 that: "[T]he Government 
is the Guarantee that all just & legal Contracts shall be perform'd; but with us they are 
daily broken, & necessarily will be so, whilst our Money continues in its present fluc- 
tuating Circumstances."12 
Mann's interpretation of litigation, that "debtors conceded liability before payment 
for their creditors' convenience,"'3 assumes a key empirical fact: that litigation will 
occur close in time to the execution of the debt agreement. The ambition of debt rec- 
ordation is to establish a legal priority to a debtor's assets. Delay of any period reduces 
the value of the debt by affording an opportunity for other creditors to establish claims 
prior or equivalent to the previously extended debt. Using the records of the Plymouth 
County courts, I examined over 3500 cases ending in a default judgment in the period 
1724 to 1750 to determine the length of time between the date the parties entered debt 
agreements and the date creditors filed suit to collect.14 My interpretation-that con- 
fessed judgments and defaults in the first half of the eighteenth century primarily rep- 
resented real defaults-implies an interval between debt execution and litigation be- 
yond the term of the debt. 
The customary terms of credit extended to local retailers in the period ranged from 
six to twelve months, though sometimes less.'5 I found that the median interval be- 
tween debt agreement and litigation for all debt litigation ending in default between 
1724 and 1750 was 531.5 days (17.5 months). Only 14.5% of all debt cases resulting 
in default were litigated within six months of the execution of the debt agreement. I 
therefore concluded that the vast majority of default judgments-that is, at least 
85.5%-represented litigation after real defaults. Periods of a high litigation volume 
would therefore reflect widespread economic distress or a delaying tactic in anticipa- 
tion of inflation, rather than, as Mann suggested, the extension of credit and an agree- 
ment between debtors and creditors to secure debts with default judgments. 
Anecdotal evidence in historians' accounts confirms that litigation was "a last re- 
sort" for creditors and, indeed, that colonial creditors incurred great costs to obtain in- 
formation about debtors' financial status and to keep any negative information secret 
" An Enquiry into the State of the Bills of Credit of the Province of Massachusetts-Bay in 
New-England in a Letter From a Gentleman in Boston to a Merchant in London (n.p. 1743), re- 
printed in Davis, Colonial Currency Reprints, vol. 4, pp. 162-63. 
12 A Letter to a Member of the Honourable House of Representatives, on the Present State of 
the Bills of Credit (Boston, n.p. 1736), reprinted in Davis, Colonial Currency Reprints, vol. 3, pp. 
160-61. I found strong ties between currency policies, debt litigation, and the seeds of Revolution 
in Massachusetts. During a period of severe currency scarcity (and high levels of debt litigation), 
there emerged a widespread popular movement to establish a private bank, backed by land. Par- 
liament suppressed the Land Bank by applying the Bubble Act to the colonies in 1740. John Ad- 
ams later claimed that the "act to destroy the Land Bank scheme raised a greater ferment in this 
province than the Stamp Act did." Adams, Works, vol. 4, "Novanglus," p. 49 (emphasis added). 
'3 Mann, Neighbors, p. 45. 
14 Konig, Plymouth Court Records. 
'5 See Harrington, New York Merchant, p. 101, suggesting between 3 and 12 months as the 
customary terms for domestic credit; and Soltow, Economic Role, p. 133, describing customary 
domestic redit erms as between 6 and 12 months. 
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from other creditors in order to avoid having to sue.16 As described by A.G. Roeber, 
court sessions were widely attended and, indeed, "Court days" were regional, popular 
events, in part, because they were the best time for creditors to see "who was recover- 
ing against whom and what their own roles might be at any given moment."'7 Outside 
of court days, creditors worked to keep negative information about debtors' financial 
status secret, according to Virginia Harrington, because "every creditor hoped to be 
able to collect his debts before the insolvency of the debtor became generally 
known."'8 
My account of the nature of colonial debt litigation is further confirmed by the 
events of Shays' Rebellion, which in 1786 and 1787 constituted a widespread attack 
on the structure of the colonial court system, culminating in the violent takeover and 
closing of many county courts in western Massachusetts and throughout New Eng- 
land. The Shaysites (who referred to themselves as Regulators) condemned its injuri- 
ous costliness, its fee structure which, they claimed, enabled judges, witnesses, and 
sheriffs to profit at the expense of litigants, and its cooptation by lawyers. Defenders 
of the regime dismissed the Regulators as "men in distress involved in debt and dis- 
contented"'9 and desiring "equal distribution of property," and "the annihilation of 
debts." 20 Several of the Regulators' principal court reform proposals, however, were 
designed chiefly to reduce costs and administer justice more effectively. One Regula- 
tor proposed adopting a system according to which creditors and debtors could inex- 
pensively record and secure debts, for example, by substituting the common pleas 
courts with "courts of record" that would specifically provide a debt-securing and re- 
cording service.21 The General Court responded by enacting the Confession Act of 
1786,22 which allowed debtors to avoid costly litigation in any debt case by "confess- 
ing" judgments against themselves to a justice of the peace for a small fee. 
Far from the picture legal historians have presented of a court system performing a 
role almost perfectly responsive to the economic and social needs of the community, 
we can conclude that the courts in New England did not provide the economic benefits 
that a debt-recording system, such as the modem UCC, achieves by reducing or elimi- 
nating uncertainty over collection. In the colonial period, creditors and debtors, as a 
general matter, incurred the costs of creditors' uncertainty about their priority with re- 
spect to other creditors, creditors' uncertainty about the nature of debtors' other debts, 
and the costs of litigating in an expensive system when creditors feared that they 
would not otherwise be repaid. 
A separate contribution of the Dissertation is to reveal the importance of monetary 
history to our understanding of the court system and legal doctrine in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. During much of the colonial period, the New England econ- 
omy largely functioned without the widespread circulation of currency (paper or spe- 
16 See Soltow, Economic Role, pp. 140-42. W. T. Baxter's review of the debt collection prac- 
tices of the Hancock family in Massachusetts led him to conclude similarly that "[a]most every 
account ells the same long- drawn-out story of dawdle and delay." Baxter, House, p. 192. 
17 See Roeber, Faithful Magistrates, pp. 85, and 73-95. 
18 Harrington, New York Merchant, p. 119. 
19 Letter from William Plumer to John Hale (13 August 1786), in Publications of the Colo- 
nial Society of Massachusetts, vol. 11, p. 386. 
20 Letter from William Plumer to John Hale (20 September 1786), in Publications of the Co- 
lonial Society of Massachusetts, vol. 11, p. 392. 
21 See Taylor, Western Massachusetts, p. 198 n. 21, citing Newton, Independent Chronicle 
(Boston), 8 June 1786. 
22 1786-1787 The Acts and Resolves Public and Private of the Province of Massachusetts- 
Bay, pp. 105-11, chap. 43. 
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cie).23 The scarcity of cash was profoundly important in determining the types of con- 
tractual obligations entered into by individuals. Being constrained to "quasi-barter" ex- 
changes greatly suppressed economic activity and reinforced an economic system based 
upon intracommunity exchanges and localism. Horwitz's emphasis on the prevalence of 
contracts involving direct exchanges of goods and transfers of property focused on a set 
of phenomena that might be better regarded as the effects on the legal system of a scar- 
city of currency than a "premarket" ideology. Understanding the difficulties of exchange 
without a circulating currency and the ways in which colonial merchants ameliorated 
those difficulties suggests a more materialist explanation of the communitarian aspects 
of early colonial society. Intracommunity contractual relationships were reinforced by 
economic conditions and were not necessarily driven by (although in some areas they 
plausibly coincided with) a pre-industrial, communitarian mindset. New England citi- 
zens involved in the market, however, aggressively advocated the adoption of private 
and governmental currencies as early as 1682, expecting that widespread availability of 
currency would lead to economic advance. As a consequence, the evidence Horwitz ex- 
plained would change once currency became more widely available and markets devel- 
oped whether judges actively promoted economic advance or not. 
The importance of currency policies and macroeconomic conditions in propelling liti- 
gation during particular periods reveals that legal historians' narrow focus on highly local- 
ized sources of law has been misguided. To the extent currency policies affected litigation 
trends, "law" should not be characterized as created exclusively by endogenous processes. 
The influence of currency issuance and currency policies on civil litigation reveals that 
even litigation on book accounts-the most community-oriented form of economic rela- 
tions-reflected colonial responses to conditions of monetary scarcity generated by the 
English Board of Trade and Parliament, thousands of miles away. Local communities and 
the norms prevailing within them were irrelevant o the process of establishing and im- 
plementing currency policies. Court fees similarly were determined by colonial legisla- 
tures and were not entirely sensitive to the moral climate of local communities. Although 
the fact that colonial courts reliably and mechanically enforced debt agreements was es- 
sential to colonial economic growth, the policies of the colonial courts deserve far more 
scrutiny by economic historians than they have received thus far. 
CLAIRE PRIEST, Northwestern University School ofLaw 
23 Currency scarcity also had tremendous implications for the nature of government. New 
England colonial governments in the seventeenth century, for example, were often required to 
tax in commodity currencies, such as corn and wheat, because the citizenry lacked other curren- 
cies with which to satisfy their tax obligations. This limited the extent to which government in- 
stitutions could finance and realistically expand the scope of their operations. 
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Comments on Moser, Herranz-Loncdin, and Li 
On the last day of July 1851, Lorenza Berbineau, a Boston servant girl who accom- 
panied the family of Francis Cabot Lowell II on their tour of Europe, "went to Hyde 
Park to the great Exhibition." In breathless prose, she exalted: 
It was magnificent I saw things from the United States handsome lamps machinery farming 
emplements ... from France saw a splendid door of Malachite green also tables Chairs 
vases some say it is stone some say it is a Metal it was taken from a mine I saw the Horse in 
Bronze the wild horse there was two men tying a man on to him I saw a wrought silks & 
caps wrought with gold thread a great many Swiss things cut from wood . .. some Turkey 
carpets also French Tapestry Carpets there were two large Diamon I was told the man who 
cut it was put in Prison for 21 years for cutting it so badly ... I saw some Vases made from 
Cannel Coal they looked like black Ebony ... there was a good deal of machinery from Dif- 
ferent parts of the world some of it was in motion I saw them make bricks they put the clay 
in it came out formed into brick ... I was there about 3 hours to day I got very tired.' 
The sense of being overwhelmed by the richness, variety and sheer volume of the 
Great Exhibition at Crystal Palace (there were over 100,000 objects on display) was a 
common reaction among visitors. Both Charles Dickens and Lewis Carroll acknowl- 
edged their "bewilderment" while James Ward described his "state of mental helpless- 
ness" in the face of such a phantasmagoria. 
Petra Moser finds herself in no such state of mental helplessness. She has walked 
(metaphorically, of course) along the more than 20 miles of aisles and paths that trav- 
ersed the exhibition grounds of Hyde Park, cataloguing and classifying the exhibits. 
Moreover, she has done this not just for the Crystal Palace, but also for the Centennial 
Exhibition in Philadelphia a generation later. She has meticulously catalogued almost 
33,000 exhibits by industry of application, country of origin, geographical location 
1 Berbineau, From Beacon Hill. 
